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“There is evidence of deep-seated cultural and ethical failures at many 
large financial institutions.  Whether this is due to size and complexity, bad 
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incentives or some other issues is difficult to judge, but it is another critical 
problem that needs to be addressed.” 
~ William Dudley1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Reports about misconduct in the financial sector are seemingly endless.  
Misconduct is wide-ranging and varied—from abusive practices in mortgage 
securities and commodities markets to manipulation of foreign exchange and 
interest rates.2  Truly, the reports suggest an ethical crisis in finance.  A major 
complaint is about the lack of serious efforts to hold to account executives that 
engaged in misconduct or were in leadership positions at the banks.  The events 
call into question the adequacy of the current arrangements for ensuring 
integrity in the financial sector, at the institutional and individual levels. 
This paper examines developments in the financial sector and identifies a 
role for regulatory ethics in promoting integrity and accountability.  In this 
effort, the paper also explores theoretical perspectives in ethics and how they 
can shape business behavior.  Specifically, the article proposes corporate codes 
of ethics, a mandatory requirement under the New York Stock Exchange 
Listing Rules, as instruments to promote morality in corporate conduct.  Ethics 
codes, which are internally generated, must be tailored to reflect the experience 
and made more effective.  They can be amplified to specify standards to govern 
the fiduciary duty of care applicable to executives, personal integrity and 
accountability.  This method can be effective in shaping the moral climate in 
corporations and in checking misconduct. 
Wrongful conduct reported against banks is wide-ranging and varied.  
Following are the major classes of misconduct: 
 Mortgage-related issues, at both ends: 
o Practices adopted for selling mortgage securities to 
investors,3 and 
o Foreclosure procedures in dealing with delinquent 

*Associate Professor, University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law, Common Law Section.  A 
version of this paper was presented at a conference, Normative Business Ethics in a Global 
Economy: New Directions in Donaldsonian Themes, held at The Wharton School, University of 
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, October 17–18, 2014.  I thank the participants for their valuable 
comments.  Errors and omissions are, of course, my responsibility. 
1 William C. Dudley, President and Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 
Remarks at the Global Economic Policy Forum, New York: Ending Too Big to Fail (Nov. 7, 
2013), http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2013/dud131107.html. 
2 See infra Parts II–V. 
3 See infra Section III.A.3 
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mortgages4 
 Transactions in non-financial markets—for example, commodities 
futures5 
 Interest rate manipulation (LIBOR)6 
 Manipulative practices in foreign exchange markets7 
 Questionable hiring practices in foreign jurisdictions8 
Obviously, several factors shaped the trends.  They included 
macroeconomic developments, mainly financial deregulation and switch to 
market-determined interest and exchange rates.  The developments facilitated 
financial innovation, often questionable in content.  In particular, deregulation 
enabled banks’ entry into non-traditional fields including power and 
commodities.  Banks were, quite understandably, natural players in the interest 
and exchange rate space.  These activities became profit centers.  Incentive 
systems were designed to boost business performance and results.  For 
corporate actors who engaged in misconduct, personal gain linked to business 
results was often a major consideration.  These realities inform the efforts 
made in this paper to interpret events in the financial sector in ethical terms. 
The paper has four parts, including this Introduction.  The next part 
examines some theories of business ethics and the different standards they 
prescribe for evaluating behavior.9  The third part presents an ethical analysis 
of the major types of misconduct reported against banks, examining them 
against the standards advocated in ethical theory.10  The fourth part reviews the 
outcomes faced by delinquent banks, which are mainly regulatory fines and 
sporadic disciplinary actions against individual executives involved in 
wrongdoing.11  Government agencies have targeted the banks and procured 
financial settlements.12  Put differently, the effort has mostly been restricted to 
accountability of banks, at the institutional level.13  Action against executives 

4 Nelson D. Schwartz & Sheila Dewan, $26 Billion Deal Is Said to Be Set for Homeowners, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2012, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/09/business/statesnego 
tiate-25-billion-deal-for-homeowners.html?_r=0. 
5 See infra Section III.B. 
6 See infra Section III.C. 
7 See id. 
8 Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Bank Tracked Business Linked to China Hiring, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2013, at A1, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/12/07/bank-tabulated-
business-linked-to-china-hiring/. 
9 See infra Part II. 
10 See infra Part III. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
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who engaged in wrongful conduct has been limited.14 
Finally, the fifth part advocates the strengthening of corporate codes of 
ethics to promote business integrity and accountability.15  Ethical codes are 
now a regulatory requirement and they provide a ready vehicle for codifying 
the norms to govern executive behavior.16  Thomas Donaldson argued that 
internally developed norms can be effective in promoting an ethical culture in 
corporations and in avoiding the shortcomings of regulation, such as 
recalcitrance.17 
II.  FINANCIAL MISCONDUCT—AN ETHICAL EVALUATION 
As pointed out, interpreting some varieties of financial misconduct in 
ethical terms can be problematic.  This is about the business purposes that 
inspired the questionable behavior.  For instance, the hiring decisions at 
JPMorgan Chase were made, obviously, to please powerful interests in a large 
overseas market.18  Is the ethical argument weaker because the decision was 
made ostensibly for corporate benefit?  Can business advantage be an 
appropriate measure?  There can be similar difficulties in dealing with banks’ 
derivatives business.  A common refrain is that there was insufficient 
understanding of the risks in credit derivatives.  Is there an ethical aspect to the 
decision to take up business in credit derivatives without adequate knowledge 
and awareness?  Was there an ethical failure when executives, through their 
actions, imposed on the banks risks they did not fully appreciate? 
The apparent ethical tension makes it necessary to flesh out more clearly 
the boundaries of legitimate business conduct and possible transgressions.  The 
definitional issue is a necessary first step in applying the yardstick of ethics.  
This part consists of two sections.  The first reviews some of the standards that 
have been prescribed in ethical theory and the second attempts to identify an 
equilibrium standard for business conduct. 
A.  Ethical Standards and Their Different Shades 
The ethical standards that have been prescribed by theorists vary 
significantly in degree.  On the one hand, there is the conventional “honesty is 

14 Id. 
15 See infra Part IV. 
16 Id. 
17 Thomas Donaldson, Hedge Fund Ethics, 18 BUS. ETHICS Q. 405 (2008). 
18 Protess & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 8. 
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the best policy” standard.19  This approach eschews idealism, more or less, and 
views ethics largely as instrumental in promoting business.  On the other, there 
are more absolute standards that present ethical behavior as intrinsically 
good.20  John Dobson stressed “virtue ethics” and was not overly concerned 
with the business outcomes of moral conduct.21  Then there is the middle 
ground that avoids strict formulations.22  This is the “moral free space” for 
business corporations that Donaldson and Dunfee identified.23  These differing 
perspectives, examined below, point towards the need to identify an optimal 
standard. 
1.  Instrumental Ethics 
In general, financial theory of recent decades perceives ethical 
elements—for example, trust and reputation—as market-generated and driven 
by the motive of wealth maximization.24  Diamond noted similar profit-seeking 
behavior in debt markets in nurturing trust among participants.25  The idea is 
that the wealth maximization motive can inspire proper business conduct.26  
This mode of thinking was carried even further in the law-and-economics 
movement that was influential in the 1980s and 1990s.27  For example, 
Easterbrook and Fischel argued that issues such as social responsibility must be 
left to the financial markets.28  Investors will have the freedom to choose 
between companies that were socially responsible and those that were not.  In 
this approach, wealth maximization trumped ethical concerns. 
The instrumental view of ethics is aligned to a bias against regulation.  A 
rather extreme anti-regulation argument came from Alan Greenspan, then chair 

19 See generally Gabriel Abend, THE MORAL BACKGROUND: AN INQUIRY INTO THE 
HISTORY OF BUSINESS ETHICS (2014). 
20 See, e.g., John Dobson, Ethics in Finance II, 53 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 15 (1997). 
21 Id. 
22 Thomas Donaldson & Thomas W. Dunfee, Ties that Bind in Business Ethics: Social 
Contracts and Why They Matter, 26 J. BANKING & FIN. 1853 (2002). 
23 Id. 
24 See, e.g., Hayne E. Leland & David H. Pyle, Informational Asymmetries, Financial 
Structure, and Financial Intermediation, 32 J. FIN. 371 (1977). 
25 Douglas W. Diamond, Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets, 97 J. POL. ECON. 828 
(1989). 
26 Id. 
27 See, e.g., id. 
28 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW (1991). 
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of the Federal Reserve.29  Greenspan called for abolishing the statute against 
fraud.  Brooksley Born, former head of the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC), stated: “[Alan Greenspan] explained there wasn't a need 
for a law against fraud because if a floor broker was committing fraud, the 
customer would figure it out and stop doing business with him.”30 
To be clear, market practices can be effective in checking misconduct.  
This is true, but the argument is probably more valid when the times are 
“normal.”  The range and volume of misconduct recently seen in banks suggest 
that the times were quite far from normal.  When the culture and climate are in 
reasonable order with no major patterns of lax conduct, markets can internalize 
ethics.  This can be so even if the driving considerations are amoral and the 
incentive is financial gain, rather than virtue. 
The limits of market as the source of ethical behavior are evident in the 
saga of the financial sector.  Patterns of wrongful behavior prevailed across 
banks and in a range of activities—a veritable epidemic.31  These suggest a 
significant change in market culture.  There was greater tolerance of wrongful 
behavior, evident, for example, from collusive practices among executives 
across banks in LIBOR manipulation.32  The experience underscores the need 
for more robust and nuanced frameworks that are not entirely dependent on 
current moods in markets. 
2.  Virtue Ethics 
Another school argues for a stronger, absolute version of ethics.  It 
perceives ethical behavior as an end in itself, more or less.  John Dobson 
advocated this more robust version and termed the concept virtue ethics.  In the 
context of creative accounting practices, he argued for traveling beyond 
external criteria, such as expectations of the users of financial statements or the 
utilitarian goal of generating overall benefit.  According to Dobson, these 
considerations are no more than constraints on behavior and they hardly 
promote virtue.33  Earlier in 1993, Dobson treated ethical behavior as an inner 
issue for individuals,34 tracing it to older traditions that date back to David 

29 Manuel Roig-Franiza, Brooksley Born, the Cassandra of the Derivatives Crisis, WASH. 
POST (May 26, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/25/AR 
2009052502108.html.   
30 Id.  Born had sounded early warnings about the risks in derivatives.  Id. 
31 See id. 
32 See id. 
33 Dobson, supra note 20. 
34 John Dobson, The Role of Ethics, 49 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 57 (1993). 
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Hume (1711–1776)35 and Adam Smith (1723–1790)36. 
For virtue ethics, an important point of distinction from instrumental 
ethics is the concern in virtue ethics with the “internal” aspect.37  Even before 
Dobson, the internal dimension had been emphasized by MacIntyre.38  In virtue 
ethics, rectitude is inspired by inner needs and urges of individuals, rather than 
external factors, such as quest for wealth or recognition.39  To put it differently, 
instrumental ethics relies on sensory attractions and worldly incentives to guide 
behavior.40  In contrast, virtue ethics understands morality as an inner quality, 
driven by higher spiritual needs rather than acquisitive and possessive qualities, 
dictated by sensory attractions.41 
Virtue ethics sets a lofty bar.  Given the imperfections in human 
character and personality, there can be challenges in implementing virtue 
ethics, without denying its value as an ideal.  It would probably be easier for 
individuals to practice virtue ethics, but it would be more challenging at the 
collective or corporate level.  We can only speculate how far the human species 
has evolved to a level where a large majority can rise above sensory attractions 
and sensual temptations and have the ability to do right, regardless of anything.  
Yet history shows the difference leadership can make.  Moral exemplars, such 
as George Washington and Mahatma Gandhi, inspired large numbers of people 
to sacrifice immediate gain and accept hardship in pursuit of higher goals.42 
However, moral exemplars and inspirational phases happen only 
sporadically.  In the recent deluge of financial misconduct, the opposite was 
probably true.  It was apparently one misdeed inspiring another and one 
wrongdoer leading another.  Judge Hellerstein, in convicting Kareem 
Serageldin of Credit Suisse of inflating the value of securities to hide losses, 
described Serageldin’s conduct as “a small piece of an overall evil climate 

35 Maurice Cranston, David Hume, ENCYC. BRITTANICA, http://www.britannica.com/ 
biography/David-Hume (last updated May 21, 2015). 
36 Robert L. Heilbroner, Adam Smith, ENCYC. BRITTANICA, http://www.britannica.com/ 
biography/Adam-Smith (last updated Nov. 23, 2014). 
37 Dobson, supra note 20, at 16. 
38 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (2d ed. 1984). 
39 Dobson, supra note 20, at 16–17. 
40 See id. at 16. 
41 See id. at 16–17.  The Indian spiritual classic, Katha Upanishad, states that the human face 
with its sensory openings focuses on the outer world; it is only the wise that turn their gaze inward.  
VALERIE J. ROEBUCK, THE UPANISHADS 327 (1st ed. 2000).  In keeping with the democratic spirit 
of the present age and collective arrangements (such as governments and corporations) that 
dominate life, it is perhaps necessary to strive for greater diffusion of this variety of wisdom. 
42 See Dobson, supra note 20, at 17–18 (discussing the impact leaders have on the ethics of 
the entire organization). 
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inside that bank and many other banks.”43 
A greater problem in actualizing virtue ethics is the corporate stock 
market system in which executives function.  Greenfield pointed out the 
difficulties for executives operating under a fiduciary duty to maximize 
shareholder wealth and an amoral climate that treats financial penalties for 
infractions as a part of the cost of doing business.44  Yet the recent financial 
misconduct and the penalties banks have paid to settle with governments 
indicate the perils in adopting amoral approaches and striving towards wealth 
maximization with little regard for other factors. 
3.  Moral Free Space—A Middle Ground? 
Between the poles of instrumental ethics and virtue ethics, Donaldson 
and Dunfee offer a more open and adaptive framework.45  This is the 
Integrative Social Contracts Theory (ISCT).46  This model eschews setting 
rigid standards for companies and is more sensitive to the dynamic 
environment in which businesses operate.47  At the same time, a minimum 
standard of conduct is emphasized.48  Donaldson and Dunfee explained that the 
“moral free space” in their construct permits “nations and other economic 
communities to shape their distinctive concepts of economic fairness, but it 
draws the line at flagrant neglect of core human values.”49  In this framework, 
morality would be conditional or situational.50  Donaldson and Dunfee offered 
an illustration by referring to recent changes in the expectations framework in 
which corporations now function; in addition to competitive advantages, 
corporations must now pay attention to “a variety of issues involving fairness 
and quality of life.”51 
ISCT has at its core the notion that ethical standards evolve in societies 
according to the ideas and values of the time.52  It reflects, somewhat, the 

43 Rachel Abrams & Peter Lattman, Ex-Credit Suisse Executive Sentenced in Mortgage Bond 
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2013, at B3, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/11/22/ex-credit-
suisse-executive-sentenced-in-mortgage-case/?_r=0 (quoting J. Hellerstein). 
44 Kent Greenfield, Corporate Ethics in a Devilish System, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 427, 428 
(2008). 
45 See Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 22, at 1859.  
46 Id. at 1854. 
47 Id. at 1859. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 1855. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
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Hegelian concept of zeitgeist, or the spirit of the times.53  This implies that the 
ethical standard is not static.54  Rather it constantly evolves, as a product of 
broad societal consensus.55  In essence, ISCT avoids the polar positions of 
instrumental ethics, which gives a freer rein to primeval instincts and virtue 
ethics, which operates at a more rarefied level.56  ISCT is sensitive to the 
corporate or collective character of ethics in contemporary business, 
particularly in comparison with virtue ethics, which can be quite challenging at 
the collective level.57  However, ISCT hesitates to be prescriptive and this can 
limit its ability to deal with ethical epidemics such as the crisis in the financial 
sector. 
B.  Searching for an Equilibrium Standard 
The goals and emphasis vary quite dramatically in the ethical standards 
that have been prescribed by theorists.  Virtue ethics sets the bar high.  Without 
detracting from its aspirational value, it is probably too lofty for realistic 
application to business behavior.  At the other end, instrumental ethics and 
wealth maximization goals can justify a sizable part of the wrongful behavior 
reported against banks.  The need is for a unifying theory that offers an optimal 
or equilibrium standard.  Basic moral precepts (do not lie, be fair, respect the 
environment, and the like) are important, but such broad-brush concepts cannot 
provide full moral clarity to enterprises.58  Rather, the goal must be to develop 
an ethical culture that encourages the practice of moral precepts.  Recent 
financial misconduct provides a useful context to explore these issues. 
There are at least three dimensions to the challenges in developing a 
climate that encourages business rectitude, and these are interrelated.  First, 
business behavior occurs mostly in the corporate setting, which is a collective 
arrangement.59  It is not just individuals doing their own things; rather, it is 
individuals in groups engaging in corporate, collaborative action that has its 
own logic and rationale.  At the next level, corporate enterprises operate in 
competitive markets and their practices are often shaped by trends in the 

53 Zeitgeist, ENCYC. BRITTANICA, http://www.britannica.com/topic/Zeitgeist-philosophy (last 
visited Oct. 6, 2015). 
54 See Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 22, at 1855. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 THOMAS DONALDSON & THOMAS W. DUNFEE, TIES THAT BIND: A SOCIAL CONTRACTS 
APPROACH TO BUSINESS ETHICS 8 (1999) [hereinafter TIES THAT BIND]. 
59 See Dobson, supra note 20, at 21. 
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market.60  These factors are exogenous, at least in a limited sense.61  They are 
the second aspect.62  The third is incentives—a thing economic theory often 
overemphasizes.63 
The dynamics of business behavior and their intersection with ethics are 
apparent in Citigroup’s credit derivatives business.64  Derivatives are 
particularly appropriate for ethical analysis because of the complex nature of 
these instruments and reports about inadequate understanding of the risks in 
them.65  The ambiguity was highlighted by Judge Jed Rakoff, in the context of 
criminal law.66  Judge Rakoff questioned whether the banks’ brush with 
derivatives was merely a case of negligence or “at least in part, . . . fraudulent 
practice[ ], of dubious mortgages portrayed as sound risks and packaged into 
ever more esoteric financial instruments, the fundamental weaknesses of which 
were intentionally obscured?”67  There is no clear answer to this question.  
Citigroup recently made a $7 billion settlement with the Department of Justice 
to close the charges over its mortgage securities business.68  The story of 
Citigroup’s derivatives business brings out some important dynamics of 
corporate conduct, the play of hierarchical influences, and the impact of 
personal friendships.  They underscore the complexities of corporate ethics. 
1.  Individual Behavior and the Corporate Setting 
Business ethics in the corporate context, to state the obvious, is not 
simply about individuals making their own moral choices.  Many times, they 
could be acting under organizational pressures, possibly even against their 
personal judgment.69  Citigroup made a rather late plunge into credit 

60 See id. at 21–22. 
61 See id. 
62 See id. 
63 See id. 
64 Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been 
Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/ 
jan/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Michael Corkery, Citi Settles Mortgage Securities Inquiry for $7 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, July 
15, 2014, at B1, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/14/citigroup-and-u-s-reach-7-billion-
mortgage-settlement/?_r=0.  This is subject to a caveat: given the circumstances, it is not clear 
whether the mere act of making a settlement can be treated as admission of wrongdoing by banks.  
See infra Section II.B.1.  The settlement could be no more than a strategy to buy peace and to show 
contrition.  These would be useful from a business standpoint in the prevailing atmosphere of 
hostility to the financial sector, exemplified by the Occupy Wall Street movement. 
69 This problem is true of any collective setting.  A major ethical question is how far 
individuals who are a part of the system have the moral freedom to act according to their 
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derivatives business.  The company became active in the business in 2002 
when Charles Prince became the head of corporate and investment banking.70  
Prince, understandably, wished to improve business, and turned to derivatives 
for generating greater volumes.71  Between 2003 and 2005, Collateralized Debt 
Obligations (CDO) issued by Citigroup went up from $6 billion to over $20 
billion. 
The chain was complicated.  Charles Prince, who was instrumental in 
Citigroup’s derivatives business, had little personal knowledge on the subject.72  
He was encouraged in joining the derivatives bandwagon by Robert Rubin, 
who at the time was a director on the bank’s board.73  Rubin had impressive 
credentials as a former Goldman Sachs executive and Treasury Secretary under 
President Clinton.74  Incidentally, he was also among the leading proponents of 
financial deregulation in the 1990s.75  Rubin reportedly urged Prince saying: 
“You have to take more risk if you want to earn more.”76  To be fair, a factor in 
Rubin’s recommendation of derivatives business was a concern that Citigroup 
was falling behind rivals such as Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs.77  This 
is dealt with in the next subsection in the discussion on competitive pressures.78 
Another issue was with the risk oversight function in Citigroup.79  This 
was about personal friendship among longstanding employees.80  Thomas 
Maheras, the functional head of derivatives trading, Randolph Barker, the 
deputy of Maheras, and David Bushnell, the senior risk officer charged with 
monitoring risk were all colleagues of long standing.81  Reportedly, the 
personal friendship among them affected the quality of oversight and in 2008 
the Federal Reserve made a “scathing review” of risk management at 

conscience without risking adverse impact.  The recently-developed whistle-blower mechanism 
seeks to empower diligent employees and even provide an economic incentive to them. 
70 Eric Dash & Julie Creswell, Citigroup Saw No Red Flags Even as It Made Bolder Bets, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2008, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/23/business/23citi.html?page 
wanted=all. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  There is an interesting aside from the perspectives 
of corporate governance and accountability.  Dash and Creswell described Rubin as “an architect 
of the bank’s strategy,” and pointed out that he “did not have direct responsibility for a Citigroup 
unit.”  Id.  This would be a case of an individual initiating an action without responsibility for its 
consequences. 
77 Id. 
78 See infra Section II.B.2. 
79 Dash & Creswell, supra note 70. 
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Citigroup.82 
Superior-subordinate relationships and interpersonal ties are among the 
influences that shape behavior in corporations, as the Citigroup story indicates.  
They mold decision-making and determine outcomes.  In the setting described, 
it is debatable whether the decision to do business in derivatives could have 
been avoided, even with greater knowledge about their complexities and risks.  
Individual employees can hardly disagree with the strategy determined by the 
leadership.  Leaving aside ethical conundrums, consequences can be serious for 
subordinate employees in hierarchical organizations unwilling to act according 
to directions. 
2.  Competitive Pressures and Their Impact 
Market competition was a major consideration in Robert Rubin’s efforts 
to promote derivatives business in Citigroup.83  When competitors were active 
in the business and were earning sizable profits, it would be challenging for 
Citigroup to stay away merely on principle or for lack of expertise.  In a 
company operating in competitive markets, under relentless scrutiny from 
media and equity analysts, CEOs can ignore an apparently profitable business 
only at their own peril.  Charles Prince stated in mid-2007 at the peak of the 
derivatives saga, just before the implosion in 2008: “When the music stops, in 
terms of liquidity, things will be complicated.  But as long as the music is 
playing, you’ve got to get up and dance.  We’re still dancing.”84 
Seemingly flippant, yet Prince’s statement accurately reflected the 
transient nature of the derivatives business as well as the competitive pressures 
of the market.  Liquidity was a product of trade in derivatives by the major 
banks, which made it hard for other players to stay away from the melee.  
Prudence, while probably valid for bankers of an earlier age, would have been 
out of place in Wall Street, circa 2007 AD.  In the new age, the ethics that 
underpin prudence could be a casualty. 
3.  Incentives and Their Power 
The third dimension is incentives.  Competitive pressures and staying 
ahead in the market are about profits for corporations.  The incentives are 

82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Michiyo Nakomoto & David Wighton, Citigroup Chief Stays Bullish on Buy-Outs, FIN. 
TIMES (July 9, 2007, 10:08 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/80e2987a-2e50-11dc-821c-0000779 
fd2ac.html#axzz3njjQR1hp. 
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organizational.  For executives, a more direct and personal reward would be 
bonus.  Compensation structures generally link pay to performance.  This 
assures executives of personal benefit and sensitizes them to competition and 
market developments.  Thomas Maheras, head of Citigroup’s derivatives 
business, was among the most highly paid employees and made over $30 
million at the peak.85  His deputy Randolph Barker made between $15 million 
and $20 million.86 
Financial incentives are an important influence on executive behavior.  
Directions set by organizational superiors and financial reward motivate 
executives to pursue business opportunities.  In this pursuit, ethical ambiguities 
might not be serious deterrents as long as there is no criminality.  This supports 
the argument made in the concluding part for personal accountability as a 
powerful incentive in providing a better ethical compass for executives.87 
III.  FINANCIAL WRONGDOING—SEEN THROUGH THE ETHICAL LENS 
The misconduct reported against banks is wide-ranging and varied.  Each 
type—mortgage securities and interest rate manipulation, to name two—is 
different in character and warrants individual analysis from an ethical 
perspective.  This part examines the instances of financial misconduct through 
the ethical lens.  The analysis begins with credit derivatives,88 which are 
probably the most challenging from the ethical standpoint.  The position with 
most other types of misconduct is relatively straightforward.  For instance, 
manipulation of currency and interest rates involved breach of a basic moral 
precept: Do not lie.89  Similarly, bank operations in commodities markets 
amounted to profiteering which has been recognized for a long time as 
unethical, often even illegal.  This part consists of three sections that deal with 
credit derivatives,90 banks’ operations in non-financial markets,91 and 
manipulative practices in forex and interest rate markets.92 

85 Dash & Creswell, supra note 70. 
86 Id. 
87 See infra Part V. 
88 See infra Section III.A. 
89 TIES THAT BIND, supra note 58. 
90 See infra Section III.A. 
91 See infra Section III.B. 
92 See infra Section III.C. 
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A.  Credit Derivatives and Their Ethics 
The credit derivatives phenomenon has a number of ingredients.  These 
include financial engineering on Wall Street, congressional encouragement to 
affirmative lending, facilitation by government-sponsored housing agencies 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, questionable practices in mortgage lending and 
marketing of derivatives, problems with credit ratings by rating agencies, and 
failure of Congress to regulate derivatives despite sufficient warnings.  Each 
had its own limited logic.  Together, however, they formed the heady mixture 
that caused the Financial Crisis of 2008–2009, followed by unprecedented 
financial intervention by the U.S. government through the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP) and by the Federal Reserve with its quantitative 
easing.  The components of the derivatives imbroglio are discussed below. 
1.  Financial Engineering on Wall Street 
The financial community, understandably, is in a constant quest to 
improve returns for clients.  For investors looking for fixed income securities, 
the effort was to increase yield by combining low-risk/low-return debt (e.g., 
treasury bonds) with high-risk/high-return debt (e.g., credit card debt and junk 
bonds).93  The goal was to achieve optimal risk-return balance.94  This was the 
theory behind pooling a variety of debt securities into credit derivatives 
consisting of a range of portfolios: corporate bonds, residential mortgages, 
automobile loans, credit card debt, and so on.95  These pools were named 
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO), Collateralized Loan Obligations 
(CLO), and so on.96  By creating and selling these derivatives, banks could 
transfer their loan portfolios and the risk in them to investors and free up their 
capital.  This would enable them to lend more, leading to credit expansion. 
The pools in CDO/CLO contained debt of varying quality that had been 
put together.  Credit rating was used to divide the pool into different slices or 
tranches according to the level of risk.  This would help in selling individual 
tranches to different investors according to their risk appetite.  Treasury bonds 
and secured corporate debt would have high credit rating, but low return.97  

93 See generally P.M. Vasudev, Credit Derivatives: Understanding Their Characteristics and 
Risk Potential, in THE RISK OF INVESTMENT PRODUCTS: FROM PRODUCT INNOVATION TO 
RISK COMPLIANCE 101 (Michael CS Wong ed., 2011). 
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Conversely, subprime mortgages and credit card debt would have low rating 
but high returns.98  Investors could buy a tranche of debt that matched their risk 
tolerance level and the yield was acceptable. 
The debt portfolios, or credit derivatives as they came to be called, were 
obviously complex pools and making sense of them was a challenge.  To 
overcome this problem, credit rating was used as a tool.  In buying the 
tranches, investors did not have to rely solely on representations from sellers.  
They could look to the rating given by expert agencies. 
A further protection for the buyers of credit derivatives, in particular the 
high-risk tranches, was Credit Default Swaps (CDS).  These are similar to 
credit insurance.  Investors could purchase CDS from companies such as 
American International Group (AIG) to protect themselves against default.  In 
this arrangement, the CDS seller would be liable to pay in case of default by 
borrowers of the underlying debt.  More significantly, they also had to pay in 
case of a fall in market value of the credit derivatives held by investors.  
Finally, banks that sold the derivatives retained the most risky part of the 
portfolio, which was termed the “toxic waste.”  This provided further assurance 
to investors who purchased the other tranches.  These were the building blocks 
on which derivatives trade was structured.99 
It would be hard to find moral faults with the credit derivatives business 
as it developed on Wall Street—up to the stage described.  There was 
economic substance in the transactions, and also a purpose.  Investors looking 
for better yield from fixed-income securities were offered instruments that 
promised higher returns.  The picture got murkier with the advent of 
“synthetic” credit derivatives developed for “reference” portfolios of debt.  The 
synthetic version did not, in fact, have actual debt portfolios in them but were 
built on other portfolios; hence their name.  JPMorgan with its BISTRO (Broad 
Index Synthetic Trust Offering) was among the first to offer synthetic CDO 
that were purely speculative.100 
With synthetic CDO and reference portfolios, banks sold non-existent 
bundles of debt.101  Several reference portfolios were constructed for a given 
bundle of debt and this practice, coupled with sale of CDS for synthetic CDO, 
contributed to systemic risk.102  Buyers of synthetic credit derivatives had an 

98 Id. 
99 See generally id. 
100 See generally J.P. Morgan & RiskMetrics Group, The J.P. Morgan Guide to Credit 
Derivatives,  INVESTINGINBONDS.COM, www.investinginbonds.com/assets/files/Intro_to_Credit_ 
Derivatives.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 2015). 
101 Id. 
102 Michael Gibson, Credit Derivatives and Risk Management, 4 FED. RES. BANK ATLANTA 
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incentive that could be termed perverse.  They stood to gain on default in the 
debt portfolio, which triggered liability of the CDS seller.103  Buyers of 
synthetic derivatives would pay a fraction of the value of the reference 
portfolio and use the money to purchase default swaps.104  JPMorgan’s 
BISTRO had a value of $10 billion for its reference portfolio of debt, but was 
funded only to the extent of $700 million or seven percent.105  With the default 
swaps in hand, buyers of synthetic credit derivatives could collect money from 
the swap seller if there was a default in the underlying portfolio or a fall in its 
market value. 
AIG was a large seller of default swaps.  It sold swaps both for real credit 
derivatives that had debt portfolios and the synthetic version modeled on the 
real ones.106  Synthetic credit derivatives and default swaps for them multiplied 
the liability of swap sellers several times the actual value of the debt in real 
portfolios.107  This was the systemic risk in credit derivatives.108  Payment 
obligations for swap sellers could be a multiple of the value of the debt covered 
by the swaps.109  This factor contributed to the meltdown in AIG in 2008, 
which was averted by financial assistance from the Federal Reserve.110 
Synthetic CDO and default swaps for them probably pushed the line of 
ethics.  The legitimacy of the instruments and selling them in the market were 
both questionable.  They represented a move from legitimate risk-taking into 
the realm of pure speculation.  This was, moreover, speculation of a destructive 
variety because buyers of CDS for synthetic CDO would profit only on the 
happening of a negative event—namely, default in the underlying portfolio or 
fall in its market value.  These buyers had no substantive economic interest in 
the debt, but they had a vested interest in default or other negative 
developments.  To this extent, the ethics of recent financial engineering on 
Wall Street is open to challenge.  However, the financial sector was not the 
only actor on the scene. 
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2.  Affirmative Lending, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac 
The bundling of debt into credit derivatives and selling them in the 
market happened alongside an explosion in lending.  There were at least three 
factors in this development.  One was the expansion of mortgage market funds, 
which grew from under $100 billion in 1996 to a peak of over $600 billion in 
2005.111  A second factor was the stepping up of role by the government-
sponsored enterprises (GSEs)—Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—in the mortgage 
market.  The share of GSEs went up from 5 percent of the total market funds in 
the 1970s, gradually increasing in the following decades to cross 50 percent in 
the early 1990s.112  The GSE’s share stayed at this level except for a dip to 
about 40 percent during the years of the Credit Crisis.113  By 2010, the 
percentage had leapt back to 54.114  The data underscores the influence 
government policy had in the growth of the mortgage market in recent decades.  
This was a causal factor in the development of credit derivatives, which were 
bought in large numbers by the GSEs. 
The two factors—namely, increased role of GSEs and expansion of the 
mortgage market—occurred in the backdrop of encouragement to affirmative 
lending under Congressional policy.  This was an important factor in the 
subprime phenomenon.  Direct policy intervention in lending began with the 
Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA)115 enacted during Jimmy 
Carter’s presidency (1976–1980).  It continued with the social justice and 
affirmative action themes that animated the Great Society vision of President 
Lyndon Johnson (1963–1968).  Earlier efforts in housing were the Fair 
Housing Act (1968),116 the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (1974),117 and the 
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (1975).118  These laws attempted to remove 
non-economic barriers to housing finance and used disclosures and 
transparency to encourage lending to weaker sections. 
The effort under the CRA was more direct.  It extended the affirmative 
principle to lending and encouraged banks to meet “the credit needs of [the] 

111 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT 
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 70 (2011), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf 
[hereinafter FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT]  
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114 Id. at 69. 
115 Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901–2908 (2015). 
116 Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619, 3631 (1968). 
117 Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1974). 
118 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2801–2811 (1975). 
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entire community, including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, 
consistent with the safe and sound operation” of the banks.119  Starting as a 
commendatory principle, it was strengthened over the years.120 In 1989, the 
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA)121 
introduced a procedure for evaluating banks that had their affirmative lending 
record as one of the measures.  In 1994, the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act122 listed the CRA score of banks among the criteria 
for grant of license to open interstate branches.  These incentives encouraged 
commercial banks to increase affirmative lending and drove the growth of 
subprime lending in the years that followed.123 
Another direct measure came from the Federal Housing Enterprises 
Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992.124  This legislation required 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to set specific goals for purchase of loans made 
to low-income groups and underserved housing areas.125  This was a major 
economic facilitator of subprime lending.126  It provided a stream of funding 
and reduced the risk for banks in affirmative lending.127  Government policies 
led to a steep rise in subprime mortgages from the mid-1990s.128  The subprime 
category rose from under 10% of total mortgages in 1996 to over 23% in 
2006.129 
3.  Mortgage Selling Practices 
To reiterate, banks’ ability to sell mortgage loan accounts was an 
important factor in the derivatives saga.130  This improved banks’ ability to 
offer new mortgages to customers.131  This incentive clearly, encouraged banks 
to sell mortgage securities packaged into derivatives and they were not too 

119 12 U.S.C. § 2903. 
120 For a positive assessment of the impact of the CRA and affirmative lending, see Michael 
S. Barr, Credit Where It Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act and Its Critics, 80 N.Y. L. REV. 
513 (2005). 
121 Pub. L. No. 107-73, 103 Stat. 183. 
122 Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338. 
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124 Pub. L. No. 102-550, 106 Stat. 3941. 
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particular about the methods adopted for the purpose.132  The anecdotal 
instances, presented below, reveal the trends and their consequences. 
 Countrywide Financial, which was later acquired by Bank of 
America, had a fast-lane lending program nicknamed 
“hustle.”133  Under the program, employees were awarded 
bonuses based on how fast they disbursed loans.134  This led to 
compromises on borrower verification and the loans were later 
sold Fannie and Freddie.135  A jury has found Bank of America 
liable for its practices and the government seeks $848 million in 
damages.136 
 Out of the total settlement of $13 billion that JPMorgan Chase has 
agreed to, $5.1 billion is payable to the GSEs for the shoddy 
mortgages sold to them.137 
 Wells Fargo paid $335 million to settle claims of the GSEs about 
misstatements made in the mortgage securities the bank sold 
them.138 
 Dexia, a European bank that purchased mortgages from JPMorgan, 
has filed a lawsuit alleging that JPMorgan adjusted critical 
reviews to hide fraudulent home appraisals and overextended 
borrowers.139 
 Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) made a settlement of $153.7million 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) over 
misstatements in the sale of mortgages to investors.140 
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TIMES, Oct. 26, 2013, at B1, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/10/25/regulator-announces-own-
pact-with-jpmorgan. 
138 Shayndi Raice, Wells Fargo Settles with FHFA for $335 Million, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 6, 
2013, 1:16 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230444820457918173200985059 
4. 
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Other than Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which were large purchasers of 
subprime mortgages, there were also smaller, private buyers as the data show.  
In addition to mortgage selling practices, other related misconduct has also 
been reported against banks. 
 Goldman Sachs betted against its own credit product and paid SEC 
$550 million to settle the case.141 
 Bear Sterns and Credit Suisse received compensation ($137.8 
million and $5.7 million respectively) from sellers of shoddy 
mortgages, but did not pass on to the customers to whom they 
sold the mortgages.142 
4.  Derivatives and Regulatory Issues 
Government policy, discussed above, facilitated banks’ mortgage 
business and this was compounded by the omission to regulate derivatives, 
which were a by-product of the mortgage business.  The problems with 
derivatives have been known for several years.  Derivatives received constant 
attention from policymakers during the 1990s.  Thomas surveyed the five 
proposals that were introduced in Congress, with varying regulatory 
approaches.143  The legislative proposals included the following: 
 Setting up a Federal Derivative Commission144 
 Creating a self-regulatory agency for derivatives dealers145 
 Tightening internal controls in financial institutions146 
 Standards of financial responsibility applicable to derivatives 
dealers147 
 Grant of authority to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) to oversee derivatives dealers and insurance companies 
(e.g. AIG)148 
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 Ban on use of derivatives by regulated entities for speculation149 
Together, the proposals were comprehensive in scope and content.  
Although lacking a common thread, laws based on their principles could have 
checked derivatives and their downsides.  But the 1990s was the era of 
deregulation.  Regulatory efforts fell by the wayside.  Brooksley Born, then 
chair of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), was among the 
few who called for regulation.150  But she was rebuffed.151  Powerful voices 
opposed regulation, including Alan Greenspan, Larry Summers, Robert Rubin, 
and Arthur Levitt.152 
Derivatives, or more precisely trade in them, are now regulated under the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.153  The 
Dodd-Frank Act essentially regulates derivatives trade transactions by 
promoting transparency and better order in the market.  It makes little effort to 
interfere with the speculative features that created systemic instability – for 
example, synthetic CDO and multiple CDS for a single portfolio of debt.154 
5.  Credit Rating Issues 
Credit rating agencies’ work can be cited as yet another factor in the 
derivatives phenomenon.  Rating agencies were targeted by critics and 
regulators when the financial markets unraveled during the Crisis of 2008–09.  
There can be a basic issue with the business model of credit rating.  The 
agencies normally work for the groups who would benefit from their rating, 
such as sellers of derivatives, and this can affect the independence of the 
agencies.  Another potential explanation for the reportedly questionable quality 
of credit rating was the complex nature of the pools of debt and the 
mathematical models that were developed for valuing them.155 
To be clear, treatment of subprime mortgages is an important criticism 
leveled against the rating agencies.  However, in a universe of rising residential 
values, it might not be unrealistic for the agencies to assume that prices will 
continue to increase in the future – as they had done in the past.  This 
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reasoning, apparently, underpinned the model.  Gillian Tett pointed out: 
While America’s corporate world had suffered several booms and recessions in 
the later 20th century, the housing market had followed a steady path of 
growth[,] . . . [b]ut since the second world war, there had never been a 
nationwide house-price slump.156 
If house prices could only go up, credit histories of individual borrowers 
mattered little.  If a borrower defaulted, the house could always be sold and the 
loan recovered.  This reasoning can explain, if not justify, much of the ratings 
awarded by the agencies for the credit derivatives created by the banks.  Again, 
lack of diligence was not exclusive to sellers of derivatives or credit rating 
agencies.  It equally afflicted buyers. Bayerische Landesbank, a German bank 
interested in buying credit derivatives that included subprime mortgages, was 
ready to make the purchase even without data on potential defaults.157 
Significantly, the SEC has not brought criminal charges against rating 
agencies.  In a 2010 report, the SEC criticized Moody’s for issuing high ratings 
based on a coding error and for not revising the ratings after discovering the 
error.158  The Department of Justice filed a civil lawsuit against Standard & 
Poor’s in 2013 claiming damages of $5 billion, and according to a recent 
report, the agency is willing to pay $1 billion in settlement without admitting 
any wrongdoing.159 
Several factors, thus, contributed to the derivatives phenomenon.  The 
challenge for ethical theory is to deal with deficiencies of this nature.  Within 
banks, it was the lack of diligence and prudence combined with behavior that 
was clearly unethical.  These were compounded by external factors, mainly a 
ready market for mortgage securities.  These factors have inflicted a huge cost 
on the banks and their shareholders in the form of penalties and settlements.160 
B.  Banks in Non-Financial Markets 
This section reviews banks’ participation in non-financial markets that 
raises serious ethical concerns.  Banks went beyond simple investment in non-
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financial avenues that were opened up by deregulatory legislation such as the 
Commodities Futures Modernization Act.161  Questionable practices by banks 
are reported in the aluminum market, which is unregulated, in electric power, 
which is a regulated utility and in ethanol credits, which are needed for 
regulatory compliance. 162 
1.  Goldman Sachs in the Aluminum Market 
Goldman Sachs bought a warehousing company in 2010 and reportedly 
lengthened the storage time of aluminum to create shortages and drive prices 
up.163  Goldman offered storage to clients who invested in aluminum, 
presumably on advice from Goldman.164  The clients were also offered 
incentives to extend storage.165  The stocks were moved around among 
warehouses to skirt London Metal Exchange (LME) regulations on storage 
period.166  The practice created shortages in aluminum markets and pushed up 
prices.167  The additional cost for American consumers over three years has 
been estimated at $5 billion.168 
A further twist is Goldman’s presence in LME, which regulates the 
aluminum market.169  LME is owned by its members that included Goldman 
Sachs, Barclays Bank, and Citigroup.170  The President of Goldman’s 
warehouse subsidiary sat on the warehouse committee of LME that made the 
rules on storage times.171 Goldman was apparently a player at both ends – with 
a seat on the rule-making committee at the exchange and in making use of the 
rules for its advantage.172 
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2.  JPMorgan I – Power Business 
In the acquisition of Bear Stearns in 2008, JPMorgan also obtained rights 
to sell electricity from some power plants.173  The plants were inefficient and 
operated with obsolete technology.174  Between September 2010 and June 
2011, JPMorgan executives adopted several schemes to offer energy at prices 
“calculated to falsely appear attractive.”175  This resulted in overpayments by 
power authorities in California and Michigan.176  When an investigation was 
launched, JPMorgan did not cooperate and drove the regulators to court to 
obtain documents.177  The bank allegedly “planned and executed a systematic 
cover-up.”178  JPMorgan has settled the California case by paying $410 million 
in penalty and disgorgement, and has also given up disputed claims of $265 
million.179 
3.  JPMorgan II – Ethanol Credits 
To promote the use of renewable fuel, federal regulations require mixing 
gasoline with ethanol and a carrot-and-stick approach is used for 
enforcement.180  Failure to add ethanol can result in fines up to $32,500 a day, 
while compliance earns credits.181  The credits are transferable and this 
presents an opportunity for profit.182  There is a market for ethanol credits 
because of the problems in storing ethanol-mixed gasoline at conventional gas 
stations.183184  Ethanol-mixed gasoline causes faster corrosion of tanks.185  The 
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Manipulation Case for $500 Million, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2013, http://dealbook.nytimes. 
com/2013/07/17/jpmorgan-in-talks-to-settle-energy-manipulation-case-for-500-million. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
178 See id. 
179 Brian Wingfield & Dawn Kopecki, JPMorgan to Pay $410 Million in U.S. FERC 
Settlement, BLOOMBERG BUS. (July 30, 2013, 12:09 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-
07-30/jpmorgan-to-pay-410-million-in-u-s-ferc-settlement.html. 
180 Gretchen Morgenson & Robert Gebeloff, Wall St. Exploits Ethanol Credits, and Prices 
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choice is, therefore, between renovating the facilities and purchasing ethanol 
credits.186  Gas stations often prefer to purchase credits and thereby save on the 
investment that is needed for upgrading their facilities.187  This has contributed 
to the growth of the ethanol credits market.188 
Trade in ethanol credits requires registration with the US Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), which is open to anyone – not just persons who earn 
credits and those who want to buy them for use.189  In keeping with recent 
orthodoxy, the EPA conceived the open structure to encourage a free market in 
ethanol credits.190  Morgan Stanley, JPMorgan, Citigroup, and Barclays are 
among the registered traders.191  The ethanol credits market has seen a twenty-
fold price increase in six months.192 Reportedly JPMorgan is a major purchaser 
of the credits and its strategy is to “buy up every available credit.”193 
It is apparent that the activities of banks in non-financial markets, 
narrated above, are not simple investments.194  They were attempts to profiteer 
through ethically-questionable methods.  The cases are hardly border line.  For 
Goldman Sachs, it would be legitimate to advise clients on investments and 
help improve returns.  But the issue becomes ethical when efforts are made to 
manipulate markets and drive prices up, imposing unreasonable costs on 
consumers.  This case is no different with JPMorgan’s power business schemes 
that had clear ethical dimensions.  With ethanol credits, JPMorgan used its 
financial power to build a commanding position in the market.  This can 
explain the steep rise in the price of credits.195 
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C.  Rate Manipulation – LIBOR and Forex 
Manipulation of interest and exchange rates is another major class of 
financial misconduct.  The LIBOR (London Inter-Bank Offer Rate) scandal 
surfaced in 2011 and huge penalties were levied on major banks.  It has also 
led to changes in the system for setting the anchor rate.  Forex market practices 
are more recent and investigation is still underway. 
1.  The LIBOR Issue 
The emergence of LIBOR as a benchmark can be traced to financial 
globalization, the emergence of flexible or floating interest rates under the 
Garn–St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982,196 and, more recently, 
the development of interest rate derivatives.197  The core complaint against 
banks is that they misreported the rates at which they could borrow in the 
London money market.198  Until April 2013, LIBOR was constructed by British 
Bankers’ Association (BBA), an industry group, based on inputs from the 
international banks on BBA’s LIBOR panel.199  The panel banks would 
regularly report the rates at which they could borrow in the London market and 
BBA would set the rate by eliminating the highest and lowest of the reported 
rates and averaging the rest.200  This average rate is LIBOR, published 
worldwide by Thomson Reuters.201 LIBOR is reported for transactions in 
several currencies and for many tenors, such as one, three, and six months.202 
LIBOR is the anchor or the benchmark rate in variable rate credit 
transactions worldwide.203  The banks on BBA’s LIBOR panel are among the 
largest in the world and the rate at which they can borrow is treated as the 
lowest possible interest in financial markets.204  LIBOR forms the basis for 
other loan transactions and a premium is added for borrowers depending on 
their credit standing, perceived level of risk and similar factors.205 
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As a benchmark, LIBOR determines the effective rate of interest in 
myriad credit transactions.206  Its impact is enormous.207  According to John 
Kiff, there are “uncounted tens of billions of dollars of adjustable rate home 
mortgages and other consumer loans around the globe in which LIBOR, in one 
way or another, is referenced.”208  LIBOR is also a standard in interest rate 
derivatives and forward rate agreements, which are used both for risk 
protection and speculation.209  The Wheatley Review placed “the notional 
value of financial products using LIBOR” at a minimum of $300 trillion, and 
also referred to a “number of other estimates . . . ranging from $300 trillion up 
to $800 trillion.”210 
LIBOR was misreported both on the higher and the lower sides.211  There 
were several incentives for misreporting rates, including illicit gain for rate 
submitters from traders in interest rate derivatives, efforts by senior 
management during the Credit Crisis to reduce perceptions of risk, and an 
apparent misunderstanding by Barclays’ CEO that the Bank of England 
indicated a wish for reporting lower rates.212  Networks of employees across 
banks misreported rates at one another’s behest, often for illicit personal 
gain.213  This was linked to trade in interest rate derivatives, which are another 
product of financial engineering.214  Like with credit derivatives, the original 
rationale for interest rate derivatives was to manage risks – in this case, floating 
rates of interest would be converted to fixed rates.215  But soon a market 
developed for trade in these derivatives with speculation becoming a feature.216 
The Wheatley Review, commissioned by the UK government in the 
wake of the scandal, made a number of recommendations.  These included 
transfer of the LIBOR setting process to a new regulator, use of actual 
transaction data for the purpose, and strengthening internal controls at the 
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reporting banks.217 The recommendations have been accepted by the UK 
government. The episode, which involved wrongdoing in banks, imposed costs 
on the banks running to several hundred million dollars. UBS of Switzerland 
paid penalties of $1.5 billion to regulators in UK and US while Barclays paid 
$450 million. For the Royal Bank of Scotland, the cost of settlement was over 
$600 million.218 
Personal gain was a factor in the misreporting of rates by bank 
employees. To the extent misreporting generated profits, the banks were also 
beneficiaries. The breach of ethics in earning these profits is apparent and 
penalties have been paid as the cost of the breach.  Significantly, reports also 
refer to a potential role of regulators in the LIBOR phenomenon.  Bank of 
England is said to have encouraged banks to report lower rates.219  The New 
York Federal Reserve was aware of misreporting of rates, but did nothing.220 
2.  Forex Rates Manipulation  
Regulators in UK, US, Germany, and Switzerland are pursuing 
investigations into forex rate manipulation.  A charge that has surfaced is that 
bank employees would execute transactions for clients and then wait for 
movements in rates before reporting to clients.  If rate movements were 
favorable, transactions would be reported at higher rates.221  Quite obviously, 
this would benefit the banks/their employees. 
The city of Philadelphia and a group of institutional investors have filed 
an antitrust lawsuit against twelve large banks accusing them of rigging the 
forex market. According to the suit, bank employees used names such as The 
Cartel, The Bandits’ Club, and The Mafia, and swapped confidential customer 
orders and trading positions.  They colluded to set prices.  The methods that 
were used had interesting names – “'front running/trading ahead,' 'banging the 
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close,' and 'painting the screen.'"222 
Banks have initiated several measures in response.  More than thirty 
employees in different banks have been dismissed or suspended.223  Since a 
culture of conversation among employees across banks contributed to the 
phenomenon, banks have started switching to electronic operations to reduce 
human intervention in the forex market.224  To eliminate conflicts of interests, 
Deutsche Bank, RBS, and UBS are reported to be “reviewing rules on 
currencies traders making bets with their own money”.225  The fact that they 
could do so, to begin with, offers an important insight into the culture at the 
banks. 
With interest and forex rate manipulation, the case is clearer.  Ethics was 
compromised, for corporate profits or personal gains for employees or possibly 
both.  In all cases, banks’ customers – City of Detroit, to name one226 – were 
the victims. 
IV.  FINANCIAL MISCONDUCT AND THE ETHICAL ORDER 
Misconduct in the financial sector, serial and varied, creates significant 
ethical challenges.  This part explores whether, in the aftermath of recent 
events, an ethical order can still be treated as endogenous to the financial 
sector.  The issue is examined from the prism of the Social Contracts Theory, 
which is underpinned by the efficiency hypernorm.227 
In broad terms, the argument is that a moral order can arise from within 
the market.  A combination of cultural and business factors would contribute to 
this outcome.  Donaldson and Dunfee explained how implicit contracts are a 
part of the basic software of business ethics in the social contracts framework.  
The efficiency hypernorm that underpins these contracts motivates actors to 
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achieve social goods such as health, education, housing, food, clothing, and 
social justice.228  Other than protecting property rights, the hypernorm also 
requires duties and public remedies to support key business behaviors such as 
keeping promises.229  The framework borrows from the contractarian principles 
of classicists–Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and John Rawls–to strengthen the 
social argument and to identify an innate tendency in the community to 
develop efficient arrangements based on trust and reciprocity.  In broad terms, 
rational actors will develop institutions that are geared to achieve the social 
goods and those actors are informed by ethical conduct that promotes overall 
welfare. 
The general validity of the social contract framework is undeniable.  It 
was evident in the self-governing traditions in leading Anglo-American 
business institutions–namely, the joint stock company and the stock market.  
The institutions were, to a significant extent, self-regulating and reflected the 
trends inherent in the society.  An important question is whether the challenges 
and complexities of the present require more concerted response and 
systematic management.  Specifically in the financial sector, some major 
problems that undermine the social contract theory are power and equational 
imbalances among actors, imperfections in enforcement, and changes in 
operational methods.  These issues are examined below. The current 
environment, conditioned by the factors pointed out, is complex and 
increasingly impersonal.  Approaches based on traditional contracting 
principles may need refinement in this setting. 
A.  Power Imbalances 
Accommodative policies of the Federal Reserve and implicit government 
guarantees emerged in the 1990s, crystallizing with the rescue of Long Term 
Capital Management.230  These policies undermine the culture of caution in 
which banks traditionally operated.231  Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley's 
decision to adopt bank holding company structures in 2008, at the height of the 
Credit Crisis, is instructive.  It enabled them to access Federal Reserve 
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funds.232  The structural arrangements and the safety net provided by the 
Federal Reserve empower and strengthen bank executives.233  Conversely, they 
weaken other stakeholders–mainly, clients who transacted with the banks and 
shareholders who have borne the regulatory penalties. 
Disparity and power imbalance are evident in the interest and forex rate 
markets.  These markets are under near-complete control of banks, which are 
one of the parties to the transactions.  Clients, who are the other party, lack 
access to the inner workings of the market; they have much less knowledge of 
the reported manipulative practices discussed above.  This equation made it 
possible for banks and their executives to engage in wrongful practice and to 
benefit from wrongdoing, while customers lost. Therefore, imbalances in the 
market can hinder the development of social contracts based on shared values 
or even interests. 
B.  Imperfections in Enforcement 
A moral order must necessarily include a remedy.  Remedies are not 
simply about accountability, ex post, but are equally about having mechanisms 
that promote responsible behavior.  In responding to financial misconduct, 
ranging from mortgage securities to manipulation of interest and exchange 
rates, government agencies have been at the forefront, levying huge fines on 
banks.234  Their principal method has been to levy penalties on banks.235  This 
approach effectively ignores the old maxim about corporations having no 
bodies to be kicked and no souls to be damned.236  This method punishes bank 
shareholders, but largely ignores the accountability of the executives who were 
responsible for the misconduct. 
To be fair, there have been sporadic actions against a small number of 
executives.  The government punished executives, including Kareem 
Serageldin, former head of structured credit trading at Credit Suisse; Fabrice 
Tourre, a trader at Goldman Sachs; and Jerome Kerviel of Societe Generale 
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whom the government convicted for acts of unauthorized trading.237  
Significantly, Kerviel of Societe Generale maintained that his superiors were 
receptive to his actions as long as they were profitable.238 
Government’s enforcement approach has attracted numerous criticisms. 
Zuberbuhler pointed out how penalties on banks ignored individual 
responsibility.239  Henning explained that senior bank managers could escape 
by pointing fingers at lower-level employees.240  Ted Kaufman, a former 
senator, targeted the legal profession for its role in the “complete breakdown in 
effective white-collar law enforcement against the most powerful in the wake 
of a devastating financial crisis.”241 
Reports are available about some private litigation against bank directors 
and executives.  The outcome is not quite encouraging from the standpoints of 
accountability and standard-setting for future conduct.  In re Citigroup 
Shareholder Derivative Litigation, shareholders charged Citigroup directors 
with breach of fiduciary duties in overseeing the derivatives business, but the 
suit was dismissed by the Delaware court.242  A suit filed against JPMorgan 
directors for the loss of over $6 billion in its derivatives business–the so-called 
London Whale–was dismissed by the US District Court.243  But the court 
allowed the suit against CEO Jamie Dimon and former CFO Douglas 
Braunstein to proceed.244  Citigroup agreed to pay $1.13 billion to purchasers 
of mortgage securities.245  On balance, reports do not indicate significant 
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efforts by stakeholders to hold bank executives to account, which is surprising 
given the vibrancy of the plaintiff bar in the US and the incentive systems in 
place. 
C.  Banks’ Operating Methods 
There have been major changes in banking in the recent decades. For 
one, banks have become larger.  Another is the increasing use of online 
transactions that reduces human interaction.  Diminished face-to-face contact 
can undermine the personal element in customer relations and consequently, 
the concern for customers’ interests.  These trends can encourage self-seeking 
behavior by executives, at the cost of customers – be they retail mortgage 
borrowers or business enterprises doing forex transactions.  These are some 
issues at the human or behavioral level. 
At the business level, credit derivatives are an important development.  
They enable banks to offload customer loan accounts by selling them to others.  
This was an important factor in the subprime crisis.  With derivatives, banks no 
longer had to worry about the credit quality of borrowers; moral hazard was a 
natural consequence.  The Dodd-Frank Act, as pointed out, merely seeks to 
regulate trade in credit derivatives. 
Subprime credit, reportedly, continues; it has shifted in recent years from 
housing loans to automobile loans. Credit derivatives are, again, at the root of 
the boom in auto loans.246  The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency noted 
that “signs of risk in auto lending [are] beginning to emerge” and even though   
the “results have yet to show large-scale deterioration at the portfolio level, . . . 
signs of increasing risk are evident.”247 
In sum, the financial sector is subject to myriad influences that 
undermine social contracts and ethical norms.  Yet the need for social values 
and norms has never been greater.  The conclusion explores a role for codes of 
ethics in inculcating ethical norms and accountability mechanisms – as 
endogenous to corporate institutions. 
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V.  CODES OF ETHICS – A POTENTIAL VENUE 
Business ethics emerged as a regulatory concern in the 1970s.248  The 
development was triggered by the corruption scandals that led to the enactment 
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.249  Since the mid-1970s, several 
corporations have adopted ethics codes and appointed ethics officers.  Many 
corporations also offer employees training programs in ethics.250  Ethics codes 
made an entry in business law with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,251 which 
was enacted by the Congress in response to corporate accounting scandals.  
The act requires codes of ethics for senior financial officers (§ 406) and affords 
protection to employees complaining about fraudulent activities in companies 
(§ 806). 
The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 carries on with the effort to internalize 
ethics, specifically in the financial sector.  Agencies engaged in derivatives 
trade–namely, derivatives and securities clearing agencies (§§ 725 & 763), data 
depositories (§ 728), dealers and major participants (§ 731), and swap 
execution facilities (§ 733) must have Chief Compliance Officers (CCO).  
CCO job responsibilities include maintaining a code of ethics and a conflict-of-
interests policy, and providing annual confirmation about them. 
Additionally under the corporate governance standards of the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE), listed corporations must have codes of ethics.252  The 
Listed Company Manual also provides guidance on the topics to be covered in 
the codes.  Topics include dealing with conflicts of interests, appropriate use of 
corporate opportunities, confidentiality, fair dealing, taking proper care of 
company assets, legal compliance, and whistleblower protection253.  Ethics 
codes must be posted on corporate websites and confirmation must be included 
in filings with the SEC254. 
The developments in regulatory ethics, outlined above, have carried the 
subject of ethics beyond voluntary initiatives, cultural habits, or market 
traditions. Now listed corporations are required to have ethics codes and NYSE 
rules prescribe the minimum content for the codes.  “Fair dealing,” which is 
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among the prescribed contents, can be a powerful tool in checking deviant 
behaviour and promoting the moral climate in companies.  NYSE rules define 
fair dealing as follows: 
Each employee, officer and director should endeavor to deal fairly with the 
listed company's customers, suppliers, competitors and employees. None 
should take unfair advantage of anyone through manipulation, concealment, 
abuse of privileged information, misrepresentation of material facts, or any 
other unfair-dealing practice.255 
The description sets the standard of ethical conduct in dealing with 
stakeholders, including customers.  The standard would be appropriate for the 
financial sector.  It incorporates the basic moral precepts against lying, stealing, 
and cheating.  An implicit feature of the standard is its “prioritization,” as 
Schwartz termed it.256  This is about the overriding importance of values, 
unaffected by considerations of corporate profits or personal incentives for 
executives such as bonuses. The standard, if applied, can effectively check 
unfair dealing even for business advantage, not just personal gain of the 
executive in question.  It can check much of the misconduct reported against 
banks. 
The experience suggests the need for ethics codes to travel beyond 
providing commendatory guidance to executives.  They must graduate into 
more effective, self-executing frameworks that also spell out the consequences 
of breach. NYSE rules are sensitive to this aspect.  They require codes to have 
“compliance standards and procedures that will facilitate the effective 
operation.”257 
A method of making ethics codes more effective would be to clarify that 
executives are personally liable for the consequences of any breach of the 
standards. The proposition is founded in common sense notions of justice and 
fairness.  It is about holding individuals accountable for their actions and 
failures. 
A theoretical basis for personal liability is also available in corporate law. 
Piercing the corporate veil, a tool courts have long used, enables targeting 
individuals acting in a representative capacity.258  Executives, as fiduciaries of 
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corporations, are conventionally placed under the duties of loyalty and care. 
Good faith is now recognized as the third element.  Eisenberg included non-
violation of accepted standards of decency in business conduct among the 
ingredients of the duty of good faith.259  This resonates with the formulation of 
fair dealing in NYSE rules discussed above.  A breach of the duty of good faith 
can be a ground for courts to lift the corporate veil and hold executives and 
directors personally liable for their actions and failures. 
Provisions on personal liability can give teeth to the ethic codes. With 
appropriate training, executives can be sensitized to the ethical standards they 
must follow as well as the consequences of breach.  This can be valuable in 
guiding executive behavior and in deterring wrongful conduct. 
To be clear, there can be some logistical issues.  The first is about 
initiating action to strengthen corporate codes of ethics on the lines discussed.  
As I have pointed out, penalties have been levied on banks and the affected 
group is shareholders.  It would, therefore, be appropriate for shareholders to 
take up the mantle. With the rise of institutional shareholders and a nascent 
trend for them to communicate with corporate directors,260 shareholders are 
well-placed for the task. 
The second issue is about effective implementation of ethics codes, 
including liability of executives for breach.  Here, boards would be the obvious 
candidate. With the recent emphasis on independence of directors and their 
skills sets, most boards ought to possess the expertise needed for effective 
oversight of the ethical governance of corporations.  The Institute of Business 
Ethics in the United Kingdom has recently argued for including ethics among 
board responsibilities.261 
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